We model technological progress as an external effect of organizational design, focusing on how factories, based on labor division, could spawn the Industrial Revolution. Dividing labor, as Adam Smith argued, facilitates invention by observers of production processes. However, entrepreneurs cannot internalize this benefit and choose labor division to facilitate monitoring. Equilibrium with few entrepreneurs features low wage shares, and high specialization, but a limited market for innovations. Conversely, with many entrepreneurs, there is a large market for innovation but little specialization because of high wage shares. Technological progress therefore occurs with a moderate scarcity of entrepreneurs. Institutional improvements affect growth ambiguously.
I. Introduction
L IKE other goods, ideas are best produced with the right organization. Since ideas drive technological change, understanding economic growth means understanding the relationship between organization and invention. What forms of organization best foster the generation of new ideas? What are the broader economic conditions in which such creative organization will emerge?
Recent efforts to answer these questions have focused, naturally enough, on the case in which invention happens to be an objective of the firm, as in the R&D laboratory or a new-product joint venture. 1 In this situation, the organization is designed to maximize the value of the inventions produced at least cost, taking into account constraints on both incentives and technology-in particular the "technology" of human cognition. Environments that are generally favorable for investment will be conducive to innovation in particular.
A wider look at the economic development process suggests, however, that much of historical technological change has occurred without the involvement of such firms. Organized R&D was rare before the twentieth century; today it is confined to a relatively small fraction of firms worldwide and is responsible for only a fraction of innovation. Nevertheless, even when it has other objectives, the firm remains the main arena of innovation: technological progress can be an unintended consequence of organizational design. This paper presents a first attempt at modeling this aspect of the determinants of economic growth.
The Industrial Revolution provides the natural backdrop for examining the issues. A distinguishing feature of the period was the rise of the factory system, in which production was carried out by workers gathered under one roof, with strict supervision and discipline and, most important perhaps, a division of labor. And although a vast literature reveals wide assent on the importance of the factory system, economic historians display little consensus-no doubt fueled by the wide cross-country variation in the manner and timing of its adoption-on just what role it played in fostering the rapid technological advances and economic growth that also characterized the era. Some commentators, like Landes (1969) , seem to argue that the factory was epiphenomenal, merely an optimal organizational response to exogenous technological change. Others, like Cohen (1981) , Millward (1981) , and North (1981) , suggest that it was the enhanced efficiency of the factory system itself relative to earlier forms of organization that generated greater surpluses, though it is difficult to see how this by itself could plausibly translate into increased rates of innovation and growth.
A third view, attributable to Adam Smith and echoed by later writers on the Industrial Revolution such as Charles Babbage and Amsa Walker, affirms a causal role for the factory system. It places the emphasis less on its static benefit of making better use of current inputs to produce current output than on a dynamic one: the adoption of the factory and, in particular, the fine division of labor into elementary tasks, engenders a "cognitive externality" by providing a superior environment to inspire invention and refinement of productive techniques. Primarily these inspirations accrue to persons, such as the occasional workman or an outside observer, other than the factory's owner. By focusing an individual's attention, it makes it easier for him to improve on old techniques. Alternatively, and complementarily, by providing a model in human form of elementary tasks, it facilitates the development of machines that can better perform those tasks. 2 This effect seems especially pertinent to understanding the development of micro-inventions, the sustained flow of which was a crucial element of the Industrial Revolution (Rosenberg, 1982; Mokyr, 1990) . Now, there is little evidence that anyone during the Industrial Revolution ever built a factory because he expected it to help him innovate. Given the nonrival nature of ideas and the difficulties in excluding them for long, this should not be surprising. More difficult still, but essential for appropriating a return to establishing a creative organization, would be proving the source of inspiration for an idea that could be widely applied. Thus, the creative role of the division of labor could be harnessed only via some other economic mechanism that would have induced the widespread adoption of the factory and the concomitant surge of technical progress.
Fortunately, the division of labor had other benefits, as Smith himself enumerated. Among them was the enhanced ability to monitor labor: a worker assigned to only a small number of tasks is less able to disguise shirking as downtime between tasks or to find opportunities to embezzle either inputs or outputs undetected. 3 This idea has been rekindled by the burgeoning literature on multitask principal-agent problems following Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992) , which highlights the gains from better incentives that come from reducing the number of tasks assigned to a single worker. Thus, an entrepreneur could benefit privately from a fine division of labor, even if she had no interest in its social benefit in terms of eased invention.
Of course dividing labor does not come for free. There are lost economies of individual scope from minute task division; costs of communication among specialized workforces, time spent coordinating tasks among disparate individuals, and resources that have to be marshaled for assembling the components of the final good produced by each worker (Becker & Murphy, 1992; Radner & Van Zandt, 1992; Bolton, & Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000; Dessein & Santos, 2006) . Entrepreneurs would have to trade off the monitoring benefit of labor division against these coordination costs.
A basic implication of incentive theory is that monitoring benefits vary with the wage level. In particular, entrepreneurs would be induced to choose a high level of labor division only when wages are low, requiring more monitoring (this relationship between wage and monitoring levels has also appeared in the efficiency wage literature, e.g., Acemoglu & Newman, 2002) . Thus, conditions in the labor market will determine an entrepreneur's choice of labor division and, via the cognitive externality, the level of technological progress.
Before delving into the mechanism by which the interaction of the monitoring and invention benefits of labor division can provide an organizational theory of growth, we note that we are abstracting from the third, well-known benefit of labor division, which is the first one Smith mentions in Wealth of Nations: "improved dexterity," or direct productivity gain. Because it is more technological than organizational, it provides less of a clear trade-off that can account for the wide cross-country variation in degree of labor division and the use of the factory system. Thus, when we refer to "division of labor" or "specialization," we mean beyond whatever level at which the marginal improved dexterity equals the marginal cost of labor division. (See note 10 for further discussion.)
The setting for our investigation is a standard occupational choice model (Banerjee & Newman, 1993) . Individuals are either workers, who supply imperfectly observable effort to firms, or entrepreneurs, who hire workers and choose the degree of labor division within their firms. The market wage will mediate both the occupational and organizational choices, since it affects the relative attraction of the occupations and the returns to monitoring. The relative scarcity of entrepreneurs and workers determines the wage and, through it, the organizational design of firms.
A special class of individuals whom we dub "nerds" are the ones who tinker with the old technology and find ways to improve it. 4 Like everyone else, they respond to incentives, choosing how much to invest in inventive effort partly on the basis of how much they expect to earn selling any inventions they may produce. But the ease of inventing is determined also by the degree of labor division in the economy's firms: fine division makes it easy to invent-for example, to replace a human performing a simple repetitive task by a machine that can do the same task much faster. With a coarse division of labor, perceiving which aspects of a job are subject to improvement or mechanical replacement is much more difficult. 5 As in earlier occupational choice models, there are different types of equilibria, uniquely determined by the relative scarcity of entrepreneurs and workers and characterized in part by the nature of the predominant organizational forms. But here, equilibria are also characterized by the accompanying rate of technological innovation.
There is an artisanal equilibrium in which workers are responsible for a large number of tasks (i.e., a low degree of labor division) and wage shares are high. There is also a "factory" equilibrium with finely divided labor and lower wage shares. The artisanal equilibrium is the statically more efficient one, since fewer resources are lost to monitoring via the costly division of labor. But it may be dynamically inefficient in the sense that the innovation rate is low, owing to the difficulty of inventing under a coarse labor division.
The factory equilibrium, statically wasteful as it may be, has the potential to generate higher rates of innovation than the artisanal one. Since it exists only when there are few entrepreneurs, this might seem to imply that entrepreneurship actually impedes innovation, the artisanal equilibrium being a case of too much of a good thing. But there is a countervailing effect. Since nerds will be able to sell their inventions to the entrepreneurs on an innovation market, the investment decision for an aspiring inventor depends on the extent of this market: the larger it is, the more revenue is available.
The scarcity of entrepreneurs therefore affects the innovation market as well as the labor market through a market size effect. When there are relatively many workers, the number of buyers of inventions is small, and though it may be easier to invent, the revenue generated will be too small to justify the effort: the innovation market shuts down. 6 At the other extreme, despite a large demand for innovations that comes when there are many entrepreneurs, innovation will be undermined by the difficulty of inventing under the artisanal mode of firm organization. Moderate ratios of entrepreneurs to workers, however, keep wage shares low so that specialization is high and ideas arrive easily, and at the same time provide enough of a market to induce people to invent. In short the model predicts an inverted U-shaped relation between the fraction of the population who are entrepreneurs and the rate of technological progress.
For long-run dynamics, the model can generate steadystate endogenous growth. We endogenize entry into the occupations by supposing there is a credit market imperfection that inhibits those with less than a threshold level of wealth from becoming entrepreneurs. Thus, the proportion of entrepreneurs will be identified with the fraction of "rich" agents, which becomes the state variable for the economy. We demonstrate the existence and local stability of steady states in which the static relation between the entrepreneur-worker (now the rich-poor) ratio and the rate of innovation and growth is maintained in the long run. An economy initially with many poor will tend to collapse to a pure subsistence equilibrium. One with many rich will make technological change slow or nonexistent, though it may appear statically affluent, with a high wage share and few resources lost to coordinating divided labor. Only economies that initially have moderate inequality will be able to sustain a high rate of steady-state innovation and growth. 7 We discuss how the basins of attraction of these steady states depend on institutional factors such as the quality of financial markets, the complexity of technology, and, most important, organizational innovations such as the demise of the putting-out system and rise of the factory.
These results suggest a possible explanation for the venerable economic historians' conundrum of why Britain among European nations was first to industrialize. Compared with some of its continental counterparts (notably France), in the 6 Something like this size effect can be gleaned by comparing industries in eighteenth-century Britain. Watchmaking had a fine division of labor going back at least a century earlier, but it served only a small (luxury) market and thus never experienced the high levels of innovation that affected other industries such as cotton and steel (Mathias, 1983) . 7 As far as we know, such an inverted-U relationship between inequality and innovation is new to the literature. In our case, inequality not only governs the innovation rate, but also is influenced by it, since it is determined in part by the incomes accruing to the inventors. late eighteenth century, both had similar levels of technology, some form of patent system, free labor markets, and (as in our model) only rudimentary and imperfect credit markets. Yet France remained a nation of family farms and small enterprise for several decades, while Britain rapidly became a nation of factories and the seat of the Industrial Revolution (Deane, 1965; Shapiro, 1967; O'Brien & Keyder, 1978; Crafts, 1985; Crouzet, 1990; Mokyr, 1990) . One difference was the distribution of wealth, which was rather more unequal in England (Clapham, 1936; Grantham, 1975; Soltow, 1980) . Other slow-to-industrialize countries, such as (northern) Italy, had greater inequality than Britain in the same period.
In addition, the analysis offers a novel perspective on precisely how the organizational innovation that was the factory contributed to the Industrial Revolution. Centralizing production under one roof (the "manufactory") rather than decentralizing it in workers' cottages (the putting-out system) would have reduced the cost of dividing labor (e.g., lower costs of transporting partly finished products from one worker to the next), even though logically, one might have had a very fine division of labor under putting out as well. It would also have increased the monitoring benefit, since enforcement of rules against straying from one's work station obviously would have been cheaper to enforce in the manufactory than under putting out. Thus, the adoption of the manufactory would have led to a finer division of labor, facilitating invention, as we have suggested, and ultimately giving us the Industrial Revolution. Of course, the manufactory did not accomplish this in isolation. Certain accessory institutional and distributional conditions were satisfied as well, in Britain especially. We shall have more to say on this in the section V.
II. The Basic Model
In this section we consider a static model in which the occupation of each agent is exogenous. In the next section, we extend the model dynamically: agents make an occupational choice that is partially constrained by their wealth, which evolves endogenously.
A. Agents and Timing
Economic activity takes place at two dates, 1 and 2. At each date, there is a measure 1 − η of normal individuals who are economically active; of these, r are entrepreneurs and 1 − r are workers. In addition, there are η nerds who are active at both dates (they are "young" at date 1 and "old" at date 2). All agents are risk neutral and are endowed with a unit of effort: normal agents use it to produce the economy's single consumption good; nerds use it to produce inventions.
Entrepreneurs can each hire up to n ≥ 2 workers or can operate on their own in artisan firms. Young nerds observe the production process carried out by the normals active at date 1. Those who succeed in finding an idea for improving technology may enter the innovation market to sell their inventions to the entrepreneurs who are active at date 2.
B. Production
Technology. Production of the consumption good involves a unit measure of jobs indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. The labor productivity for job j is a( j), and output is exp( 1 0 log[a( j)l( j)]dj), where l ( j) is the labor allocated to job j. Given this technology, labor is uniformly allocated over all jobs independent of a (·) . Output per unit labor is therefore A ≡ exp( 1 0 log a( j)dj). A firm's output is linear in the number of workers hired, up to the scale n. If the entrepreneur operates on his own without workers, he produces αA, where n/2 ≥ α ≥ 1. Thus, if an entrepreneur hires any workers at all, he must be making positive profit from each and therefore will hire n of them.
We use a quality ladder approach for modeling technical progress (Grossman & Helpman, 1991) . An invention improves the productivity of a single job by the multiplicative factor (1 + γ). If m( j) improvements are implemented on job j, its productivity becomes a ( j) = (1 + γ) m( j) a( j). 8 The technology operated by the entrepreneurs at date 1 is A. This technology is freely available to the date 2 entrepreneurs, though typically they will choose to improve it: if they purchase m innovations, the new technology is
Since each nerd can have at most one invention, we have m ≤ η < 1.
Contractibility assumptions. We make the following assumptions:
1. Worker effort is imperfectly observable; the degree of imperfection depends negatively on the division of labor. 2. Individual output is not contractible. 3. The source of ideas is not attributable; hence, entrepreneurs cannot claim ownership of them. 4. Nerd effort is not observable.
As we discussed in section I, the first assumption provides the basis on which the division of labor benefits entrepreneurs. The second assumption prevents the use of output contingent contracts such as piece rates. 9 The last 8 Thus, one job may be improved an indefinite number of times. This is a simplifying assumption that avoids the computation of the individual returns to inventing when there is a possibility of duplication or diminished returns. Our conclusions would not be altered substantially if it were relaxed, and it gives the best chance for innovation via the Smithian mechanism. It is also convenient for representing steady-state growth without the added complication of providing a theory of how new sectors come into being during the development process. 9 This is only for simplicity. Indeed, it is well understood from the multitasking literature that piece rates create poor incentives for quality provision. One solution is to separate tasks; thus, piece rates and labor division are complementary in much the same way as input monitoring and labor division. As it happens, available evidence suggests that piece rates were not widely used during the Industrial Revolution (Huberman, 1996). two assumptions are the reasons that entrepreneurs do not internalize the effects of labor division on invention: the third one prevents contracting with a nerd on the contingency that he obtained an idea because of the entrepreneur's organizational choice; combined with the last assumption, it prevents entrepreneurs from establishing "invention factories," wherein they hire nerds to produce ideas in return for wages.
Division of labor.
Here we describe how the division of labor is modeled and how it facilitates monitoring. The set of jobs can be subdivided into a number of (equal-size) components. Denoting their number by σ, each one contains 1/σ jobs; hence, σ = 1 corresponds to the early manufacturing days where artisans were put under the same roof but continued to do all the jobs involved in producing the good, while σ ≥ 2 may correspond to an assembly-line system. Workers are specialized in producing individual components; given the production technology, in order to produce a unit of the good, it is necessary to combine 1 unit of each of the σ components.
When σ = 1, a worker spreads his unit of labor time uniformly over all the jobs; hence a worker has to spend 1/σ of units of labor time to produce one unit of a component consisting of 1/σ jobs. Absent coordination problems, it does not make a difference in terms of total output whether each of n workers does all the jobs (is completely unspecialized) or is σ-specialized, with n/σ workers assigned to each component and producing σ components each: either way, output is nA.
However, as in Becker and Murphy (1992) , we assume that specialization generates coordination problems. For instance, in an assembly line, each worker has to spend time taking the component from the previous worker in line, assembling it with his own component, and passing everything to the next component. In many firms producing complex products, seamless integration between components often requires a large number of meetings, reducing time available for production.
When there are σ components, each worker specialized in one component will have to spend time coordinating with σ − 1 producers of the other components, and the cost in time units is c(σ − 1), with c > 0. Hence, total time available for production is now only 1 − c(σ − 1), so a worker can produce σ(1 − c(σ − 1)) components. Since there are n workers per firm, n/σ workers are assigned to each component, and if the entrepreneur's technology is A, total output is n(1 − c(σ − 1))A.
Compensating for the coordination cost of specialization is its monitoring benefit. 10 In our model, a worker shirks not so much by withholding effort but by engaging in a sideline activity-for instance, diverting parts to assemble and sell himself-that has a return μA, μ < 1, where A is the technology available within the firm. It is not possible to distinguish whether a worker is doing a job for the firm or for himself, but it is possible to observe which job he is doing. If a worker is assigned to a component consisting of 1/Ïf jobs and he decides to shirk, he will spend 1/Ïf of his time on those jobs, and the rest on jobs outside his assigned component. If he works, he spends all of his time on a assigned jobs. Random monitoring will therefore detect shirking with probability 1−1/σ; hence, the higher the level of labor division σ, the more effective is monitoring.
Labor contracting. On the labor market, entrepreneurs offer contracts (σ, w) consisting of a degree of specialization σ and a wage w normalized to the state of technology A that is paid only if the worker is not caught shirking.
If the worker is caught shirking, it is optimal to punish him maximally: he loses both his wage wA and the "booty" μA.
Since the shirking worker escapes detection with probability 1/σ, shirking yields him a benefit of (w + μ) A/σ, while working yields wA. Thus, the worker will shirk unless the following incentive compatibility condition holds:
Admissible contracts (σ, w) must satisfy equation (1) as well as a participation constraint. Observe that higher μ implies higher σ, given the wage. Evidence on factory organization in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is consistent with this prediction. Factories producing easily embezzled goods (high μ) had higher degrees of labor division than others: watches, for example-valuable goods that could easily be stolen and sold for close to full market value-were produced by a minute division of labor from the early eighteenth century (Mathias, 1983; Thompson, 1963) . Similarly luxury-market-oriented goods such as coaches and pianos (low μ) were still produced using traditional techniques as late as the 1830s. 11 In addition to this monitoring effect, smaller components would often tend to have thinner markets, making them less tempting to embezzle (that is, μ could be a decreasing function of σ, which would reinforce the decreasing relationship between the wage and the degree of division of labor expressed in condition (1). More broadly, economic historians have then interpret σ = 1 as a normalization, the maximum degree of specialization for which there are net output gains. If direct gains from specialization were the only appropriable benefit of the division of labor, the question of whether there is economic growth is reduced to the exogenous parametric question of whether specialization gains diminish quickly or slowly enough relative to the innovation gains. Moreover, as we note at the end of the "Labor Contracting" section, the monitoring benefit also predicts a positive correlation between productivity and specialization, so the evidence for the productivity benefit must be interpreted with care. 11 See Dodd (1843) for descriptions of piano and coach factories. Pollard (1965) offers similar evidence that in shipbuilding or housing (both low-μ), production remained organized around the individual craftsman well into the nineteenth century. emphasized embezzlement and eliciting worker effort as major concerns in shaping the organization of the first factories and as the chief reasons for the factory system's supplantation of the putting-out system (Clark, 1994; Pollard, 1965) . 12 Suppose a firm has technology A, and let u * be the outside option of a worker. The contract that a firm offers solves the program max (w,σ) 
where equation (2) is the worker incentive compatibility constraint and equation (3) is the participation constraint.
The incentive constraint binds: if it does not, the entrepreneur can increase her profit by lowering σ. Writing
The unconstrained maximum occurs at w = √ cμ, with concomitant specialization σ = 1 + √ μ/c and normalized profit π(w) = n 1 − 2 √ cμ . Clearly, if the labor market is ever to be active, entrepreneurs must prefer to hire workers (use n ≥ 2) rather than work by themselves (in which case, their normalized income is α) when the wage assumes this minimum value, that is, 2n √ cμ < n − α. We assume that this condition holds for all α in the allowed range [1, n/2], that is:
The equilibrium wage share is a function of u * . For low values, entrepreneurs are not constrained and can choose w. For high values, the participation constraint binds, and entrepreneurs increase the wage beyond w and choose less specialization.
Observe that when the participation constraint binds, if one firm has better technology than another, it will also have a finer division of labor. Since wA = u * , raising A lowers w and therefore raises σ: a firm with higher A has more to pilfer (or more to lose when its workers shirk), and this must be offset by more intensive monitoring. Thus, the model would predict 12 Pollard (1965, p.184 ) discusses work rules that resulted in dismissal for being "found a yard out of his ground," or fines for being "found from the usual place of work, except for necessary purposes, or talking to anyone out of their own Ally [sic] ," which would be difficult to implement and enforce without a high level of labor division. Except for products that could be assembled on a small table, a worker with wide responsibility would likely have to wander around the factory and talk to numerous other workers. a positive correlation between productivity and specialization in a cross-section of heterogeneous firms, but higher productivity is the cause, not the consequence, of greater specialization.
Invention. Entrepreneurs choose the degree of specialization by considering only the trade-off between coordination costs and monitoring benefits. What they do not consider is that specialization also affects how easily other agents can find ways to improve the productivity of tasks. These agents are represented by the nerds in our model.
A nerd can generate an idea on how to improve one job. If he cogitates during his youth, he observes the state-of-theart technology A together with the division of labor σ. He then randomly selects a component for study and arrives at an idea for improvement to one of the tasks in his component with probability p (σ), where p (·) is an increasing function. If instead he vegetates, he simply generates θA (θ < 1) units of the consumption good for himself.
If an invention is obtained, the nerd becomes active on the innovation market when he is old and anticipates selling his invention at a license price of q. With a measure of entrepreneurs equal to (1 − η)r, he obtains (1 − η)rq for his invention, and cogitation is worthwhile only if
The derivation of q is deferred to section C.
C. Markets and Prices
At date 1, all entrepreneurs possess the technology A, and the wage w and degree of specialization σ are determined in the labor market. Nerds then observe the production process, and, if they have the incentives to cogitate, invent with probability p(σ). At the second date, an innovation market as well as the labor market are active, and we think of them as opening in that sequence. Demand in both markets is generated by the entrepreneurs. The workers form the supply side of the labor market, while the old nerds who successfully invented when they were young supply the innovation market.
Labor market. Since entrepreneurs who hire workers will always choose to do so at the maximum scale n, labor market equilibrium will generically involve one of only two levels of the wage share w. This will correspond to a case of excess supply of workers and a case of excess demand for them; in the latter situation, equilibrium requires an entrepreneur's indifference between hiring workers and operating the technology himself.
The labor market condition is reflected in the utility u * that has to be guaranteed to a worker. Recall that the measure of entrepreneurs is r(1 − η), while that of workers is (1 − r)(1 − η). If nr < 1 − r, that is, r <r ≡ 1/(n + 1), supply exceeds demand, and the normal agents who are not hired obtain a payoff of zero. Since entrepreneurs can always find a worker who will accept any positive wage, they are not constrained-we can take u * = 0, and the equilibrium wage will be w.
If r >r when the labor market opens, the participation constraint-equation (3) in the entrepreneur's problembinds, and u * will be bid up until the potential entrepreneurs are indifferent between hiring workers and operating on their own: the corresponding wage share w, with division of labor σ, satisfies π(w) = α, since by operating on his own, an entrepreneur can get αA. (In the nongeneric case in which the labor market is just balanced (r =r), any u * corresponding to a wage share in [w, w] is consistent with market clearing.)
From the perspective of the entrepreneur, the lower output brought by specialization is the price to pay for maintaining a larger profit share. High degrees of specialization reduce aggregate output: a larger wage share would result in greater output but smaller profits for entrepreneurs. However, from a dynamic perspective, specialization may enhance growth of aggregate output insofar as it facilitates invention.
Innovation market. Suppose that a measure m < η of old nerds found ideas when young and now are bringing them to market. Each of these inventors has a monopoly on his idea and can offer it to all takers. Since improvements to each job enter symmetrically in the profit function, each entrepreneur cares only about the total number k of inventions he acquires and wants at most one copy of each. The situation therefore conforms to a case of multiproduct monopoly in which each producer can offer his product at zero marginal cost.
Trade in the innovation market takes place as follows: (a) simultaneously, each inventor sets a price for his idea; (b) each entrepreneur, taking these prices as given, chooses which inventions to purchase; (c) inventors incorporate their invention in the production process of the entrepreneurs who have agreed to purchase them. 13 An equilibrium of the innovation market is defined by a license price q i for each inventor i and an adoption strategy k l for each entrepreneur l. Taking the other inventors' prices q −i , the labor market outside option of workers u * , and the adoption strategies as given, an individual inventor does not want to modify his price. Taking the prices q i and u * as given, an entrepreneur does not want to modify his adoption strategy. We focus on symmetric (in license price) equilibria and assume that inventors cannot price-discriminate among entrepreneurs (e.g., based on their future scale of operation).
If A is the level of technology that prevailed last period, the level for an entrepreneur who acquires k inventions is A(k) = A(1 + γ) k , which is increasing and convex in k. Denote the payoff to an entrepreneur who adopts k inventions and faces outside option u * by V (k, u * ). The value of adopting k inventions is then V (k, u * ) − V (0, u * ). Now, V (k, u * ) incorporates the entrepreneur's scale decision (whether to operate as an artisan or hire workers) and the status of the participation constraint (whether it binds). The important property of V (k, u * ) is convexity in k, which it inherits from A(k). This is easy to see if the entrepreneur is an artisan (V (k, u * ) = αA(k)) or is unconstrained in the labor market (V (k, u * ) = A(k)π(w)). In the appendix, we show that convexity holds in the general case as well.
Convexity effectively weakens competition among inventors, since the marginal return from adoption is increasing. Assuming q i = q in a symmetric equilibrium, the entrepreneur who maximizes V (k, u * ) − qk will choose k = m, that is, buy all available inventions, as long as
which is less than V k (m, u * ) by convexity, satisfies both of these conditions. (If q were lower than [V (m, u * ) − V (0, u * )]/m, an inventor could increase his profit by raising his price a bit and the entrepreneurs would still purchase all of the inventions.) That this is the unique symmetric equilibrium follows from an argument in Tauman, Urbano, and Watanabe (1997) in their analysis of multiproduct price competition. Notice that in this equilibrium, the inventors extract all of the surplus from the entrepreneurs. 14 Write w(r) and σ(r) to denote the dependence of the equilibrium wage and labor division on the measure of entrepreneurs (from the labor market analysis, the wage is generically w or w, labor division σ or σ, and the normalized profit π(w) or π(w) = α, as r <r or r >r). The above discussion can be summarized in the following:
Lemma 1:
i. Let m be the measure of inventions available at the beginning of the second period. In any symmetric equilibrium of the invention market, all entrepreneurs purchase the m inventions. ii. There exists a unique symmetric price equilibrium: m) is an increasing function of m and that q(r, 0) = Aπ(w(r)) log(1 + γ).
General equilibrium. We are now ready to determine the overall equilibrium of our economy by taking account of the nerds' cogitation decisions. The fact that the license price increases in the number of inventions leads to a strategic complementarity in cogitation. This raises the possibility of multiple (Pareto-ranked) equilibria, though we shall mainly be concerned with the Pareto optimal equilibrium and how its properties depend on the fundamentals of the economy.
Suppose that a fraction φ ∈ (0, 1) of the nerds choose to cogitate at date 1. Then almost surely there will be φp(σ)η inventions on the market at date 2. This is an equilibrium only if p(σ(r))r(1 − η)q(r, φp(σ)η) = θA (if the left-hand side is less than the right, cogitating nerds would want to vegetate; if greater, the vegetators would want to cogitate). But since q(r, φp(σ)η) is increasing in φ, a single vegetating nerdthere must be some, since φ < 1-can gain by switching to cogitation (strictly speaking, this is not true in the continuum limit, but it is true of any finite economy that it approximates). Thus, the only possibilities for equilibrium are that all nerds cogitate or none do.
There is an equilibrium in which the innovation market is inactive if and only if p(σ(r))r(1 − η)q(r, 0) < θA (5) and an equilibrium with an active innovation market if and only if
If r is sufficiently small, equation (5) is satisfied, while equation (6) cannot be. Thus, when there are few entrepreneurs, the innovation market is inactive because the market for innovations is too small to encourage inventive activity. What about larger values of r? Suppose that r <r, so that w = w. Then condition (6) is satisfied when r also exceeds a threshold value r > 0 satisfying
Clearly, parameters can be chosen (in particular, let θ be small) so that r <r. In this case, there is a general equilibrium of the economy in which (w, σ) = (w, σ) and the innovation market is active. The rate of technological improvement A /A between dates 1 and 2 is (1 + γ) p(σ)η . If r >r, there are no values of r in which this high level of innovation can occur, since the innovation market is inactive for all r ∈ [0,r].
There is also a threshold valuer of r below which the inactive innovation market equilibrium exists and above which it does not as long as the wage is w. It is straightforward to check thatr > r and thatr <r for appropriate choice of parameters. Thus, there is a nonempty set of r values in which the two equilibria coexist. The cogitation equilibrium Pareto dominates the vegetating equilibrium: nerds and date 2 workers benefit from the technological improvements, though (date 1) workers and all entrepreneurs are indifferent.
Since we are interested in the possibility of growth and since multiple equilibria of this kind have been dealt with elsewhere in the literature on growth and development (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1989; Greif, 1994; Mokyr, 2005) , we shall focus on the Pareto optimal equilibrium, except for a brief discussion in section V.
For the case r >r, a similar argument establishes the existence of a threshold r ≡ θη/{(1 − η)π(w)[(1 + γ) p(σ)η − 1]}, above which the innovation market is active. Of course, if p(σ) is small enough, r may exceed 1, so that there is never innovation in the artisanal labor market equilibrium. More generally, even if the innovation market is active, the rate of innovation is lower than it is in the factory equilibrium (r <r) than in the artisanal equilibrium. (There is also a correspondingr > r below which the inactive innovation market equilibrium exists, though this shall not play much role in our analysis.)
The preceding discussion highlights the interaction between the markets for innovations and for workers. When there is excess supply of workers, the wage is small and specialization is high, making invention relatively easy. If all nerds exert effort, many inventions are offered on the market, and by convexity of their value to entrepreneurs, the price of a license is high. This would suggest that nerds indeed have strong incentives to search for inventions. However, if r is too small, the revenue rq may be so small that the expected return from invention is small compared to its cost.
When there is excess demand for workers, there are many entrepreneurs who could pay for innovations. However, specialization is low, and since the probability of discovery is now small, there can be only a few inventors active on the invention market. The price of the license will be small because entrepreneurial profits are small and because there are fewer innovations. Coupled with the low probability of success, incentives to invent are small in this case.
Therefore, there will be weak cogitation incentives when there are too few or too many entrepreneurs: in the first case, there is not enough demand for innovation to cover its cost, while in the second case, high wage shares and low specialization make invention less probable as well as less remunerative. It is only in the intermediate range that high rates of innovation will happen: both the demand for inventions and the probability of discovery are high.
We summarize this discussion with the main result of this section.
Proposition 1: Let r <r.
i. If r ∈ [0, r], the equilibrium labor contract is (w, σ), but there is no innovation. ii. If r ∈ [r,r], there is an equilibrium with labor contract (w, σ) and an active innovation market with technological improvement rate g ≡ (1 + γ) p(σ)η .
iii. If r >r, the equilibrium labor contract is (w, σ). For r ∈ (r, r) there is no innovation; for r ∈ [r, 1] the improvement rate is g ≡ (1 + γ) p(σ)η .
Note that it is possible that one of the intervals in part (iii) is empty; either way, the growth rate of technology is nonmonotonic as r varies over [0, 1]. There can be both too much as well as too little entrepreneurship (as measured by r) for innovation. When there are many entrepreneurs, individuals work in firms with little labor division, similar to artisanal systems of production. Few resources (here measured by cσ) are wasted in supervision. In this sense the economy is statically efficient since output per capita is high relative to the state of technology. But it is dynamically inefficient since it produces innovations at a low rate and technology is likely to be relatively backward.
The market size effect that drives the low innovation rate when entrepreneurs are scarce is a consequence of our assumption that each entrepreneur may hire up to n workers and therefore faces an extreme form of decreasing returns to scale. 15 Little would change with a more flexible production technology that allows entrepreneurs to hire any number of workers as long as returns decline fast enough. For instance, in the standard competitive model in which output per entrepreneur is given by a smooth production function F( ), where is the number of workers hired and F(·) satisfies standard properties, in particular the "Inada" condition lim →∞ F ( ) = 0, aggregate profit is r[F( ) − w ], where w is the equilibrium wage. Since r = 1 − r and F ( ) = w in equilibrium (here we ignore the worker incentive problem, which does not affect the argument), the aggregate profit is rF 1−r r −(1−r)F 1−r r , which is bounded above by rF 1 r . It is straightforward to see (use l'Hôpital's rule and the Inada condition) that the latter expression converges to 0 as r → 0: profit per firm grows too slowly to counter the effect of the reduction in their number. Scarcity of entrepreneurs might also reduce the monopoly power of inventors, decreasing the share of profits they can extract, and further reducing their cogitation incentives.
Smith famously argued, in what many have interpreted as self-contradiction, that the high level of specialization he observed in factories was counterproductive, requiring government intervention: the worker "becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become." Viewed from the perspective of the present model, there is no contradiction: it is the nerds, not the workers, who generate the ideas. More generally, in a world of externalities, such as the one depicted here, this is exactly what one might expect: the equilibrium degree of labor division may well be too high, likely in the range of negative marginal productivity returns, because of the monitoring benefit. Even if workers were responsible for inventing (so p[σ] might be decreasing for high levels of σ), entrepreneurs would have little reason to fully internalize the effects of labor division on worker ignorance, offering another reason that too much inequality would harm the rate innovation.
III. Dynamics
In this section we extend our model by endogenizing the occupational distribution and illustrating that the three regimes discussed in proposition 1 can be steady states. The model displays endogenous growth; the novelty here is that growth is driven by organizational design rather than a technical progress production function.
A. The Dynamic Model
Consider the above economy repeating itself infinitely often. In each period t = 1, 2, ... every one of the continuum of individuals gives birth to one offspring; with probability η, independent across lineages and periods, the child is a nerd; otherwise he is normal. Normalize the size of the population born at each period to be unity.
All individuals live for two periods and consume only in old age, when they also give birth. Normal individuals are idle in youth and active (as workers or entrepreneurs) in old age. Nerds are active in youth and, once they have cashed in on their inventions, idle in old age. Individuals born at time t have preferences characterized by the utility
where c t is generation t consumption, b t is a monetary investment made by the parent in the child's human capital, 1 > β > 0, and γ = β −β (1 − β) β−1 . Indirect utility is therefore equal to the net lifetime income y t , and the investment is βy t .
The key assumption is that there is a credit market imperfection-the parental investment effectively determines the (normal) child's occupation. We model this by supposing that there is a minimum threshold investment hA t for access into entrepreneurship. This may be interpreted as the cost of sufficient education, of a set of contacts, or even the physical capital to set the child up in business for himself as long as it is unaffected by technological improvements. Then its cost rises with the general level of technology. 16 Finally, we allow the improved technology A t from one generation to diffuse completely to become the current technology A t+1 for the next.
We continue to assume r <r. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we impose some additional conditions on the parameters. First, we assume that p(σ) is small enough that r > 1. Next, we impose:
This implies that entrepreneurship, even at its smallest scale, is preferable to working, even at the highest possible equilibrium wage; that way, in any equilibrium, agents whose parents set them up in business actually want to remain entrepreneurs. (Recall that if there is innovation in artisanal equilibrium, an entrepreneur's income is αA, while a worker gets wA ; A /A may be as high as g because the growth rate is determined in the previous period by the degree of specialization that prevailed then.) Alternatively, one could suppose that there is a high enough "private benefit" to entrepreneurship. These conditions avoid trivialities: if children of low-wage workers are not wealth constrained, all agents are rich after the first generation; if children of high-wage workers and of inventors are wealth constrained, then the proportion of rich in the economy declines and the economy always ends up at subsistence. (The second part of ii is equivalent to β(1 − η)rq(r, p(σ)η) > hA , the condition that inventors in the factory equilibrium can afford entrepreneurship for their children; it implies that inventors in the artisanal equilibrium can afford it as well.)
Nothing of significance turns on assumption 2 or its alternative; if it is violated, the analysis of equilibrium in case of excess labor demand becomes slightly more cumbersome because the ex-post indifference of entrepreneurs between hiring workers and operating on their own must be replaced by ex-ante indifference between entrepreneurship and working, taking account of innovation costs; this forces the labor market into balance ex post, lowers the highest equilibrium wage somewhat, and eliminates the possibility that entrepreneurs operate at small scale. The qualitative relationship between wealth distribution and innovation remains unchanged.
Similarly, neither the form of the parental investment motive (here it is of the "warm glow" variety) nor the fact that the parent invests directly rather than transferring cash to the child is important here. Other bequest motives would also have the threshold effects we will be exploiting below. So would allowing the child to take account of the investment cost in choosing occupations. In both cases, the analysis would be slightly more complicated, raising similar issues to those raised by violations of assumption 2.
B. Analysis
The important point to note is that if investment is less than h, the normal child is a worker (the nerd does not need the investment, and it would make no difference to the analysis if we simply assumed that his parent did not invest for him at all). We shall call children whose parents invest more than h "rich" and the rest "poor." Thus, the children of (successful) inventors, entrepreneurs, and workers when the wage is high are rich.
The state variable is r t . The above assumptions imply the following:
Lemma 2:
i. If r t < r, then r t+1 = (1 − η)r t . ii. If r ≤ r t <r, then r t+1 = (1 − η)r t + ηp(σ).
iii. If r t >r, r t = 1 − η.
Proof.
i. There is excess supply but the condition for an operative invention market is not satisfied; workers get a low wage w and their children cannot be entrepreneurs. The only ones who can are the offspring of entrepreneurs; since their profits exceedw, by assumption 3 they can invest hA t . ii. There is excess supply, hence the wage is w, but now the invention market is operative. As before, normal children of entrepreneurs can be entrepreneurs, and there are (1−η)r t of them. By assumption 3, the ηp(σ) inventors will invest enough to give their normal children access to entrepreneurship. iii. There is excess demand, hence high wages, and all children of normals can become entrepreneurs.
There are two or three steady states, depending on whether the fix point r * (= p(σ)) of (1 − η)r t−1 + ηp(σ) lies in [r,r). In either case, all steady states are locally stable.
If r * < r, we are in the "dismal case": the two steady states are r = 0 and r = 1 − η : both cases are incompatible with growth. When r = 0, the equilibrium is an economy of pure subsistence where each individual produces Aμ. The case r = 1 − η by contrast is a statically prosperous economy in which almost everyone invests and becomes a small-scale entrepreneur; this implies that there is stagnation because of the low degree of specialization. Subsistence eventually occurs if the economy starts below r; stagnant prosperity results if it begins above r. There might, however, be a short period of innovation in case the economy happens to start in [r,r], but collapse into subsistence soon follows (see figure 1) .
A slightly less dismal case occurs if r * >r; in this case, p(σ) is relatively large, and the (1−η)r t−1 +ηp(σ) branch lies above the 45 • line. Permanent high growth is not possible, though again the economy may experience growth for a few The case of greatest interest is the "hopeful" one in which r ≤ r * <r, in which there is another locally stable steady state at r * . Any economy beginning in the interval [r,r) converges to r * . Here the wage share is low and there is a high degree of division of labor and a technological growth rate of (1 + γ) ηp(σ) (see figure 2) .
(If r >r, then we are in a truly dismal case where the innovation market is never operative and the economy proceeds to either subsistence or prosperous stagnation.)
Note that except in the nongeneric case that r * =r, the economy cannot spend any time atr unless it happens to start there, so we are justified in ignoring the cases of intermediate wages.
The hopeful case depicted in figure 2 is the one that suggests the possibility of an inverse-U relation between the degree of inequality (measured by 1/r) and the rate of growth: economies with either high or low degrees of inequality (low or high r) grow slowly or not at all, while those with middling levels are the ones that generate sustained technical progress.
The discussion can be summarized in the following:
Proposition 2: Let r < r * <r, and the fraction of rich at t = 0 be r 0 .
i. If r 0 ∈ [0, r), the sequence {r t } converges to the subsistence steady state with zero growth.
ii. If r 0 ∈ [r,r), the sequence {r t } converges to r * and the economy has a steady-state growth rate of g ≡ (1 + γ) p(σ)η . iii. If r 0 >r, the sequence {r t } converges to 1−η and there is zero growth.
Note that iii depends on the simplifying assumption we made that r > 1. If r ≤ 1 − η, we are in the (possibly more plausible) situation of low (g) but positive steady-state growth.
IV. Comparative Dynamics
Here we consider four types of changes: improvements in the access to capital, regional or market integration, increases in technological complexity, and organizational innovations that reduce coordination costs.
A. Institutional Improvements in the Access to Entrepreneurship
We model this as a reduction in h necessary to run a business, a change that increases the fraction of the population that can afford to become entrepreneurs. This might come from improvements in credit markets or, if h is interpreted as a human capital acquisition cost, from education subsidies. It even comes from loosening the kinds of legal restrictions, common in many developing countries, that generally limit business start-ups (typically these bind on the less wealthy).
For a formal treatment, it is helpful to give the economy some chance of emerging from a subsistence steady state if only h were low enough. So assume that subsistence generates positive earnings sA, with s < w and that β is a random variable, independent across generations and lineages and independent of income or nerdiness. Specifically, β = β with probability b, and β < β otherwise. Let β satisfy all of the conditions in assumption 3. Notice that this modification to the model does not change the values of r andr.
In addition, assume that initially, we have h > βw, so that the economy behaves just as it did before. In particular, the subsistence steady state r = 0 always exists and is locally stable, though now people are investing βs in their children. Now let h fall to a point where βs > h > βs, and suppose that r < b <r. If we started at the subsistence steady state, the effect of this decline in h is to increase the value of r next period, from 0 to b. But this means we have (1 − η)b entrepreneurs, who hire (1 − η)nb workers at wage w. Since r < b, the innovation market begins to function (assuming the nerds coordinate on the cogitation equilibrium). The children of the entrepreneurs and inventors, as well as the children of the generous (β) workers, will become entrepreneurs next period.
Locally, the dynamics are now following the equation For plausible parameter values (η small), this exceeds r * but remains in the factory equilibrium region (less thanr) if b is small. Thus, as expected, increasing access to entrepreneurship can pull the economy out of subsistence and onto the path of industrialization and high steady-state growth.
But for other parameters (larger b), the economy may eventually leave the interval [r,r] , and the growth process slows down. Similarly, further reductions in h may turn out to be too much of a good thing: if βw > h, then all normals set their children up in business, and innovation ceases or at best declines.
Thus, improvements in institutions may have ambiguous effects, depending on where the economy is to begin with. An economy that has very poorly functioning credit markets or costly education will generally be helped by improvements in these institutions. But economies in which these institutions are functioning moderately well may actually be hurt.
If one were to measure the rate of TFP growth across economies with different qualities of institutions, one may therefore find that growth rates are not monotonic in the quality measure. Similarly, since the levels TFP will depend on the history of their growth, neither should there be any expectation of finding a monotonic pattern in a cross-country regression of TFP levels on institutional quality.
B. Geographical Linkages and the Spread of Industrial Revolution
A natural question to ask is whether integration of geographic regions might enhance the chances for a successful take-off: if one region happens to enter the high-innovation steady state, perhaps it can stimulate others to do the same. For definiteness, assume that the hopeful case parameter configuration discussed in the previous section prevails, and suppose there are two equally populated regions, 1 and 2, identical in all respects except for their wealth distributions. One has an unequal distribution with r 1 ∈ [r,r], and the other has a more equal distribution r 2 >r. Without linkages, region 1 is growing while region 2 is not.
A somewhat trivial answer to our question can be obtained if we assume that innovations can diffuse (with a lag) across regions, just as we have assumed for the baseline dynamics in the previous section, but there are no factor flows (in particular of nerds or normals) across borders. In this case, invention continues to be confined to region 1, but region 2 benefits by implementing the new ideas in the ensuing periods as they become publicly available. In steady state, consumption grows at the same rate in both regions, but region 2 will always be at a lower level, equal (at best) to the region 1 consumption of the previous period.
Of course, the assumption of complete and free diffusion is somewhat facile, made here to maximize the chances for sustained growth; indeed adopting existing technologies is rarely easy (Acemoglu, Aghion, & Zilibotti, 2006) ; if it were, there would be hardly be a problem of underdevelopment! Indeed, one interpretation of micro-inventions is that they partly involve adapting production processes or products to local conditions and markets. So let us ask whether regional interaction will allow region 2 to become a cradle of innovation once the process has started in region 1.
The simplest interesting case is complete integration of the two regions, with nerds and normals free to move, so there is effectively one large economy. There are two effects. First, there is a redistribution of wealth (change in r): let the wealth distribution r for the united region be the average of the two distributions we began with: r = (r 1 + r 2 )/2. Second, because the size of the entrepreneurial population has increased, the incentives to cogitate are strengthened. Condition (6) now becomes
because the population has doubled. Since q(r, m) = Aπ(w(r))[(1 + γ) m − 1]/m, the left-hand side of equation (7) increases, given r. It follows that r decreases, so that the basin of attraction for innovation increases in size. (A similar calculation shows that r decreases as well, so that the basin of attraction for moderate growth may also increase.) The recursion equations in lemma 2 are otherwise unchanged. The increase in the basin of attraction would seem to be good news for the spread of the Industrial Revolution. (To be sure, it is predicated on the complementarities among inventions and the lack of any possibility of duplication despite the greater population of nerds; if duplication were possible, incentives to innovate would be weakened somewhat, and the effects on the basin of attraction for high growth would be less clear.) However, whether the new integrated region will continue to grow depends on how the change in dynamics interacts with the change in initial conditions brought about by mixing the wealth distributions. Indeed, in the case we have been considering, in which r is between r 1 and r 2 , integration will lead to convergence to the high-growth steady state only if r <r. If instead r >r, then the integrated economy converges to the prosperous stagnation steady state, and the Industrial Revolution ends. Of course, other cases are possible. A growing region could integrate with a very unequal (low r) region, leading to either overall growth or stagnation. Or an unequal region and a prosperously stagnant one could integrate, and the Industrial Revolution could take off. On balance, the distributional effects of regional integration make the process of take-off only slightly less difficult. 17
C. Technological Complexity and Modern Developing Economies
To what extent can Smithian growth facilitate development in the modern world? On the one hand, a poor (low r) country's entrepreneurs may have a higher willingness to pay as soon as they are able to sell on a world market, and this may incentivize the local nerds, allowing an expanded basin of attraction similar to the case discussed above.
On the other hand, the relevant technological frontier may be further away (Acemoglu et al., 2006) . One way to model this is to think in terms of the level of complexity, represented by the task-to-population ratio; call it χ (thus far, it has been assumed equal to 1). The production technology becomes exp( χ 0 log[a t ( j)l t ( j)]dj). The growth rate is now (1 + γ) ηp/χ , and the threshold value r of educated that sustains growth is θ/{(1 − η)[(1 + γ) ηp/χ − 1]π(w)}. With simple technologies (χ small), growth rates sustained by the Smithian mechanism are high, and the economy is more likely be able to sustain growth because r is small and r is unchanged. 18 An exogenous increase in the complexity of technology will lower growth rates and increase the likelihood that technological progress comes to a halt.
If one interprets complexity as originating in a world technological frontier, one that may be expanding through internalized R&D, an implication of this observation is that Smithian growth may be a particularly inadequate mechanism by which a developing country might catch up to the rest of the world. Although an increase in χ instantaneously increases output (assuming the a( j) of the "new" steps are equal on average to the rest), over the longer run, this benefit would be overshadowed by the slowdown in growth, and a Smithian country will fall further and further behind the R&D-driven frontier. Possibly more than their more developed counterparts, such countries may have to rely on non-Smithian mechanisms (state subsidies or private sector internalized R&D, both of which became more or less common in the rich countries in the latter half of the twentieth century) to achieve innovation and growth.
D. Organizational Innovation: Revisiting the Role of the Factory in the Industrial Revolution
As suggested earlier, a decrease in the coordination cost c can be identified with the introduction of the manufactory and subsequently the early factories. When c falls, the division of labor becomes less costly for entrepreneurs. Moreover, w decreases, σ increases, and therefore r falls while r * rises. Hence, the basin of attraction of the high-growth steady state is enlarged, firms have a larger division of labor there, and the growth rate increases. There is also more income inequality in the functional distribution of income and a likely increase in inequality in the size distribution (since r * <r, increasing the fraction of rich slightly raises most inequality measures).
Observe that for r >r, since w increases, σ falls. Therefore, the rate of growth decreases in this region. Hence, in our model, organizational innovations leading to a decrease in the cost of coordination tend to intensify the dependence of growth on inequality. Once the manufactory comes into being, changes in inequality would lead to larger changes in growth rates than they would have under the putting-out system.
Our model suggests that the significant role played by the factory and the introduction of the division of labor has to do with the concomitant increase in labor division that would have facilitated invention rather than any static increase in surplus that factory production might have generated. Indeed, in our model, the factory (σ large) actually generates less surplus than does artisanal production. Some historians (e.g., Clark, 1994; Cohen, 1981) have argued similarly that in the early years of the Industrial Revolution, the factory was perhaps more profitable but not more productive than the putting-out system it replaced.
V. Conclusion
We have explored a causal link between the organization of firms and technical progress. In contrast to such links that have been explored so far in organizational growth theory, the mechanism we study involves an externality in the benefits of invention rather than on firms' internalization of those benefits, and is arguably especially pertinent to understanding early episodes of growth such as the Industrial Revolution. Starting from the Smithian idea that there is an increased likelihood of innovations in the production process when labor is more specialized, we show that entrepreneurs may be induced to choose innovation-enhancing organizations even though intractable contractual incompleteness and incentive problems prevent them from appropriating the returns to innovations. The conditions that do this in a laissez-faire market equilibrium depend on a constellation of factors: a free enterprise legal environment that allows an individual with an idea to sell it to a sufficiently large fraction of the market, an imperfect credit market that restricts entry into entrepreneurship, a distribution of wealth that is neither too equal nor too unequal, and the need of a coordination device among inventors.
An economy that generates technological progress initially may eventually violate the distributional condition or may, for reasons having to do with improvements in credit markets, subsidized education, or other redistributions, switch to a noprogress equilibrium, with firms that are too unspecialized to foster further Smithian innovation: trickle-down effects may eventually limit growth.
The chart in figure 3 plots average growth rates of per capita GDP against inequality for several European countries for the period 1820 to 1870. Growth rates are from Maddison (2001) , and inequality is measured as the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages, taken from Allen (2001) . 19 The 19 Since Allen's wage data are for Milan, "Italy" is actually Lombardy 1836-1857, with the growth taken from Pichler (2001) and calibrated to Maddison's other estimates using the two authors' estimates for Austria (Maddison' s estimate for all of Italy is somewhat lower than our imputed estimate for Lombardy; this has little effect on the basic pattern). inverted-U pattern is clearly displayed, with growth rates for the lowest-skill premium countries (Netherlands and France) slightly higher than those for the highest-skill premium country (Spain). The contrast between the Netherlands, for which the wage data are from (Protestant) Amsterdam, and Belgium, for which wages are from (Catholic) Antwerp, is also striking. Obviously evidence of this sort is at best indicative (e.g., institutions are not identical across countries, and we would rather have TFP growth data than GDP growth), but it does accord broadly with the basic predictions of our model. 20 Furthermore, the model has other implications for growth theory more generally besides the link it draws between inequality and technological progress. First, "institutional" improvements, such as the increased efficiency of credit markets, need not have monotonic effects on the rate of technological progress. Thus, starting from very poorly functioning markets, both static and dynamic efficiency are likely to improve as output increases and the demand for inventions increases enough to activate the innovation market. But further improvements to these institutions will eventually reduce the division of labor and therefore the rate of technical progress and economic growth. An economy with moderately well-functioning credit markets that has been rapidly growing will have higher productivity than one with perfect credit markets that has been growing slowly or not at all. It follows that total factor productivity need not be monotonic in the quality of institutions, either over time or in cross-section. 21 Second, taking the (manu)factory to be the organizational innovation that reduced the cost of labor division, then one interpretation is that organizational improvements may 20 So does other historical scholarship on the Industrial Revolution in Britain (Crafts & Harley, 2004; O'Brien, 1986) . This research emphasizes the peculiar roles of the enclosure movement in creating a large population of landless poor to supply the labor markets and in helping to generate a relatively large upper-middle class and concomitantly large market for manufactured goods. Lacking these elements, other European countries were slower to industrialize. 21 The model thereby also offers a mechanism for reversal-of-fortune phenomena that have been documented in historical cross-country comparisons of economic prosperity (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002). indeed have helped to lead the economy from a path of subsistence to one of sustained growth, not so much by reducing the cost of entry into entrepreneurship but, more important, by raising the equilibrium level of specialization, thereby facilitating invention. This seems to support the institutional view of the importance of the factory system in the industrial revolution, albeit perhaps not in the manner Cohen (1981) , Millward (1981) , and North (1981) argued.
Finally, it is worth remarking on the implications of the model in case of coordination failure among the inventors. For the high-wage share regime, it makes only a small difference. If there was a switch to the no-invention equilibrium, the fraction of rich would fall, as would the growth rate, albeit not by much since it was low to begin with: the new steady state would be r = 1 − η instead of r = 1 − η + ηp(σ). On the other hand, the same switch from cogitation to vegetating equilibrium in the low-wage share regime would be more dramatic. An economy in the basin of attraction of the highgrowth steady state now follows the dismal dynamics r t+1 = (1−η)r t . In short order, the economy would be carried below r C , outside the basin of attraction of high growth and outside the region where the cogitation equilibrium exists.
This analysis offers a specific interpretation to the view, expressed by some historians and economists (Crafts, 1985; Acemoglu & Zilibotti, 1997) , that the Industrial Revolution occurred because of "luck." Many factors, partly institutional, partly technological, and partly distributional, must fall into place in order for a period of sustained technological growth to emerge. As our model suggests, the path to sustained prosperity is a narrow one, difficult to find, and easily lost.
where the second inequality is due to u * /A(k) ≥ w and the last inequality by assumption 2.
If condition (A1) holds, entrepreneurs who work alone have technology A(m); since they can hire workers if they desire, it must be the case that V (m, u * ) = αA(m), that is, that u * = wA(m).
If condition (A1) does not hold, inventors sell only to entrepreneurs who hire workers. By lemma 3, we can apply the reasoning in the case of excess supply of labor and the unique symmetric equilibrium must satisfy
and entrepreneurs get V (0, u * ). Since entrepreneurs who work alone have a profit of αA(0), we must have V (0, u * ) = αA(0), and therefore u * = wA(0). Note that entrepreneurs who adopt the m innovations can hire workers at a wagê w = wA(0)/A(m). At prices q, entrepreneurs are indifferent between working alone and using technology A(0) or hiring workers and using technology A(m). The return to an inventor is αrq. If an inventor sets a price of q < q, then V (m, u * )−(m−1)q−q > A(0) and all entrepreneurs who work alone should purchase the m inventions and hire workers. This is clearly inconsistent with an equilibrium, therefore, it must be the case that condition (A1) holds. But then it must hold with an equality by condition (A2).
